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Introduction
May 21, 1998 ranks as one of the most
important dates in Indonesia’s history, when
university students led public demonstrations
that forced Suharto to resign from the
Presidency, to be replaced by B. J Habibie.
The date is now seen as the first step in
Indonesia’s reformation on the road to
becoming a genuine democracy. Many other
steps still needed to be made by government
and in law enforcement to regain public trust
and establish social and individual liberty. The
Indonesian Knowledge Organization
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, or
LIPI) has laid down eight points of
reformation that needed to be implemented
by the government regarding the change of
the president of the Indonesian Republic
(KAGAMA 1988: 4). These eight agendas
items included: (i) political reformation; (ii)
economic reformation; (iii) human resource
and educational reformation; (iv) rule of law
and human rights reformation; (v)
revitalization of technology; (vi) socio-
cultural reformation; (vii) security and defense
reformation, and refunctionalization of the
armed forces (ABRI); and (viii) reformation
of communications system, including the
press and broader public media system.
When Suharto took over as President of
Indonesia in 1967, he named his new
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administration ‘The New Order’ (Orde Baru)
to distinguish it from the ‘Old Order’ regime
of Soekarno. The designation ‘New Order’
was publicized and implemented by every
governmental official and by the military, so
the term became ubiquitous in all aspects of
political, social, and economic life. During the
three decades of the New Order era, the press
became known as ‘the Pancasila press’,
defined at the 25th Press Council Assembly
(Sidang Dewan Pers), Solo 1984, as a press
“whose’ attitude and behaviour are oriented
to the values of Pancasila and the
Fundamental Constitution of 1945" as “a
healthy, free and responsible press,
developing a trustworthy atmosphere towards
a democratic and transparent society, with a
positive interaction mechanism between the
press and the government and with the
community” (Rachmadi 1990:197-198). This
formulation, however, does not explain to
whom the Indonesian press must be
responsible and by what means it should be
monitored. In practice, the press became
totally dominated by government oversight
and control, and was required to carry out its
duties according to the government’s demands
and political interests. The Department of
Information closely monitored and restrained
what could and could not to be reported. In
consequence, the Indonesian press was only
allowed to carry out its ‘imperative function’
within the rigid guidelines laid down by the
government.
The post-Suharto governments took
remarkably swift actions in regard to press
reformasi. For example, on June 5, 1998,
Yunus Yosfiah, then Minister of Information
(Menteri Penerangan, -MENPEN) called off
the SK Menpen No. 1/1984 (‘Minister of
Information’s Letter of Explanation’) that had
authorized the government to cancel a
Newspapers Press Publishing Operation
Permit (SIUPP) at any time. Yunus Yosfiah
also cancelled SK Menpen No. 47/1975 and
SK Menpen No. 184/1978, requiring all
journalists to belong to the government-
controlled Indonesian Journalists Union
(PWI, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia), the
Newspaper Publishers Union (SPS, Serikat
Penerbit Surat kabar), and the Grafika Press
Union (SGP, Serikat Grafika Pers). They were
now free to establish and join their own
professional organizations. Then, on
September 23, 1999, President Habibie,
endorsed Law No. 40/1999, the first media
law to explicitly guarantees the freedom of
the press in Indonesia. Section 4 established
freedom of the media as a ‘basic human right’,
and Section 5 made it clear that the Indonesian
media are allowed to report on events and
opinions, including the norms of religion and
social ethics, and that they should adhere to
the principle that an accused individual must
be regarded as “innocent until charged and
convicted,” thus requiring the Indonesian
media to respect human rights and the rule of
law.
Habibie’s successor as President,
Abdurrahman Wahid, continued the
reformation of the Indonesian press. In
November 1999 he disbanded the Department
of Information, issuing never -before-
imagined freedom for the Indonesian press.
There were no longer to be governmental
agencies to control or restrain the liberty of
Indonesian press. Wahid also endorsed the
principle of a participatory and democratic
media, according to which individuals,
businesses, local communities or social
organizations were allowed to establish and
operate their own press media (McQuail 1994:
132). It is possible that Wahid had not heard
of democratic-participant media theory, but
his disbanding of the Department of
Information showed his determination to
create a more democratic society by enabling
a small-scale, interactive and participatory
press to emerge and develop without
government oversight or hindrance.
This certainly benefited the nation,
and especially the local communities, and
both minority and majority groups, given the
need to disseminate political, economic, legal,
cultural and community information essential
to the functioning of an open and participatory
democracy. Although Wahid was only in
office for 20 months (October 1999 to July
2001), he was able to validate the philosophy
and practice of decentralization on January
1, 2001, under Law No. 22/1999, transferring
much of the central government’s authority
to local regencies and municipalities. In taking
over the functions of the central government
agencies, these local governments utilized
many civil society components, including the
press, to disseminate information and
influence public opinion. The Indonesian
press also finally had the chance to monitor
and comment on local politics, and conduct
checks and balances on government
behaviour and policy-making. A question that
arises from these dramatic events is: How has
the Indonesian press performed under its new
freedom and public responsibility in this era
of reform, democracy, and decentralization?
The Changing Imperative Functions of the
Indonesian Press
At least two different approaches can
be identified in evaluating press reporting,
each linked to a different media function or
imperative. The first assesses the media’s
‘normative content’, the second its ‘business
aspect’ or profitability. In Indonesia, until
recently, the normative aspect included
adhering to stringent government guidelines
and censorship. However, in the new
reformasi and otonomi era, the Indonesian
press no longer functions as an agent of the
bureaucracy. Research findings from a 2002
survey, covering 155 local districts in
Indonesia, found that press readership also
regards newspapers as ‘cultural entities’, so
the Indonesian press performance should also
be evaluated as cultural institutions.
Following Suharto’s resignation, anyone was
free to launch a newspaper or other
publication. Although facing an economic
crisis, there has been great enthusiasm for
publishing new press and other media outlets.
Since Suharto’ s resignation to April 15, 1999,
the Department of Information approved 415
SIUPP - Press Publication Permits (Suranto
et.al. 1999: 17), and until April 15, 1999, it
had approved 852 SIUPP. As the government
no longer curbs the operations of the
Indonesian press, many publications were
launched not only to disseminate information
and express opinions, but also to make a
profit, as more people now enjoy reading
newspapers and magazines, and the media is
quick to respond to people’s demands. The
press owners in particular saw information as
a ‘product’ to be sold according to consumer
psychology and sociographic inclinations. As
Ashadi Siregar has observed, the press saw
the society merely as consumers (1999: 96),
and the many press outlets were competing
energetically to satisfy and extend their
readership. The type of news considered to
be of ‘high quality’, therefore, is that which
most pleases and attracts its readers. To create
a successful product, the reporters and
editorial staff look for news that meets this
criterion. It thus must be conceded that the
press has increasingly applied the principle
of ‘press comodification’ in conducting its
business. This reality is valid because, in
addition to being a political organ, a
newspaper is an economic enterprise that must
make a profit it is to survive. Substantial
capital has been invested in establishing the
business, which must cover operating costs
and show an adequate return to investors in a
limited amount of time. The press must thus
also operate under this ‘economic imperative’.
A popular perception exists that, in the era of
decentralization, the money making
imperative of press owners has intensified,
and that ‘standards’ have deteriorated due to
an increased exphasis and content being
devoted to entertainment, sensationalism,
sordid events, titillation and various degrees
of ‘pornography’ (as variously defined by
different groups of readers). However, a
survey of 330 journalists in 155 regencies and
cities in 25 provinces, conducted February-
April 2001 by the Center for Population and
Policy Studies, Gadjah Mada University
(CPPS 2002), revealed a very different
interpretation of press performance and
purposes. According to respondents, the
Indonesian press is significantly fulfilling a
socially responsible, normative or moral
function. The findings are summarized in the
following section. Such surveys of journalists
and studies of Indonesian press performance
are relatively rare, and this preliminary effort
to examine the performance of Indonesian
press during the early years of the reformasi
era is thus both pioneering and thought-
provoking.
Indonesian Press Reporting in the
Decentralization Era
The GMU survey of journalists asked
the 330 respondents to assign a ‘low, medium,
or high’ ranking to their newspaper’s coverage
of five main topic areas during 2001: (1)
political news, (2) KKN (corruption, collusion,
nepotism), (3) community protest against
public regulations or proposing new
regulations, (4) poverty issues, and (5) social
conflicts. The findings are summarized in
Table 1 below, where the data show the
percentage of the sample of respondents who
assessed that their papers had assigned low,
medium, or high coverage of the respective
topics, and distinguishing newspapers
published in Java and those published Outside
Java.
Table 1: Survey of Journalist
Assessmentsof their Newspaper’s
Coverage of Selected Topics
Java Newspapers
Outside Java Newspapers
Lowcoverage
MediumCoverage
Highcoverage
Lowcoverage
Mediumcoverage
Highcoverage
1. Political News 10.3
47.1 42.6
8.9 42.0
49.1
2. KKN 11.6
31.6 56.8
21.4 24.7
53.9
3. Community Reform 5.8
19.4 74.8
18.4 21.7
59.9
4. Poverty Issues 16.1
36.1 47.8 18.4
28.6 53.0
5. Social Conflicts
45.4 29.6
25.0 47.3
34.1 18.6
Source: Data selected from ‘Survey on Good
Governance and Decentralization in
Indonesia’, Center for Population and Policy
Studies, Gadjah Mada University, 2002
Notes: (i) ‘Political news’ mainly involves
reports on politicians, political parties.
elections, etc; (ii) ‘KKN’ is the Indonesian
acronym for ‘corruption, collusion and
nepotism’; (iii) ‘Community reform’ covers
two survey questions that had the same
responses: reports of community protests of
public regulations and reports of community
efforts to propose a new regulation; (iv)
‘Poverty issues’ includes reports on poverty
incidence and causes, as well as government
and other efforts to alleviate poverty; (v)
‘Social conflicts’ includes reports on intra-
community conflicts (e.g. ethnic or religious
communities), and also inter-agency conflicts
(e.g. between adjacent regencies, or between
regencies, provincial or central government
agencies).
1. Political news (line 1 of Table 1) appears
to have somewhat higher relative press
coverage Outside Java than in Java, possibly
reflecting a relatively higher familiarity (or
public contempt) for political skirmishing in
Java, or perhaps due to more alternative
channels there through which to obtain
political information. There are many other
qualitative and impressionistic indications
that the people were getting bored with the
bombardment of political news being reported
in the period between the launch of reformasi
and the eventual implementation of
decentralization.
2. KKN news (line 2) shows a higher press
interest in covering ‘corruption, collusion and
nepotism’ than general political news, and an
apparent higher intensity of interest in Java
than Outside Java. Such news evidently has a
higher prurient or sensationalist public appeal,
but it can also be taken as evidence that the
press revelations were reminding the public
of the extent of the problem and its social
costs. It also implicitly conveyed the warning
that those guilty of KKN are likely to be
exposed and shamed by such press reports.
In this regard, the Indonesian press could be
said to be performing its moral function,
despite the fact that many KKN suspects have
been able to avoid being fully investigated and
penalized.
3. News coverage of community protest
and proposals for reform (line 3) has the
highest reporting density, with more
newspapers in Java having ‘high coverage’
and fewer with ‘low coverage’ than Outside
Java. Some of this coverage was actually
encouraging local communities, NGOs and
other civil society groups, to protest unfair or
antiquated public regulations urgently in need
of reform or updating, and again shows the
press making a positive contribution in
alerting the community that they need not just
accept public regulations imposed by various
levels of government, and encouraging an
active civil society participation in public
affairs. From personal experience, I believe
that Indonesian journalists tend to have an
individual ‘special passion’ in reporting news,
beyond general news value or directives that
come from their superiors. Many were drawn
into the profession as advocates of political
or social reform and this may explain (or
‘subjectively account for’) the high ranking
given this particular topic. Positive press
coverage of public demonstrations and grass-
roots initiatives to promote reform can thus
be seen as encouraging or inciting individuals
and community organizations to get more
involved in the process of political and social
reform. In this way, the press can be regarded
as being ‘politicized’ or as making itself a tool
to help mitigate the elitist hegemony and
frequent aloofness of politicians towards
community-level needs and problems. This
role can be criticized as being partisan and
non-objective, or lauded as appropriate in
helping the Indonesian people to create a
vision and achieve a consensus on the nation’s
reformasi agenda, thus helping to realize the
hopes and aspirations of community groups
and individuals (e.g. in promoting gender
equity, religious tolerance, social cohesion and
collaboration). However, this conclusion
needs to be further confirmed by opinion
surveys in the various communities, as the
respondents who provided the information in
the present survey were all journalists (and
could be suspected of being self--serving and
self-idealizing). This underscores the need for
more surveys of press performance and public
attitudes toward it, using more detailed and
quantitative assessments of topic coverage
and of content analysis (e.g. distinguishing
objective reporting and normative
commentary).
4. News on poverty issues (line 4) shows
moderate levels of coverage, with slightly
more ‘high coverage’ and more ‘low
coverage’ in newspapers Outside Java than
in Java, presumably reflecting the greater
diversity of ‘rich resource’ and ‘poor resource’
provinces in the Outer Islands, and perhaps
the ‘over-exposure’ (and disenchantment) of
Javanese citizens with government poverty
alleviation policies and projects. This,
however, is mere speculation in the absence
of more detailed content analysis and public
opinion surveys. On the other hand, poverty
is such an all-pervasive issue that its concerns
can also be covered as part of news coverage
of politics, community protest and civil
society activism, and social conflicts, under
all of which the Indonesian press can fulfill
its moral imperative of helping focus public
interest and political concern on the problems
of the poor and disadvantaged groups in
society.
5. News on social conflicts, (line 5) rather
surprisingly shows the lowest relative
coverage in Java and even somewhat lower
Outside Java. The types of conflict being
reported were also very diverse, which, among
several other dimensions, could be construed
to include: intra-community conflicts (among
ethnic, religious, male and female special
interest and other social groups), conflicts
between local communities and local
government, political party conflicts, local
executive versus legislative council conflicts,
inter-regency conflicts, and regency-
provincial, central government conflicts.
There may thus have been some ambiguity
or confusion among respondents in
‘aggregating’ their perceptions of what
constituted ‘social conflicts’ for purposes of
the survey. Moreover, such reporting might
either have incited social tensions and
polarization, or it could was helped to be
conciliatory in helping the adversaries
understand the different views and interest
involved and in finding compromise
solutions. From a random examination of such
reporting, it would appear that reporters in
general were not driven by a normative
imperative to cover such issues (as they might
have been in regard to political, KKN,
community-wide protest, and poverty
reporting), but were more often responding
to the need to explain the sources of social
tension or violence that was threatening
community and national security and
demanded urgent attention. If this
interpretation is valid, the Indonesian press
could have shown itself capable of objective
and socially responsible performance, being
willing to involve itself in reporting on
sensitive and controversial issues, helping to
inform, educate and secure the best interests
of the people. Overall, these preliminary
survey findings suggest that Indonesian
journalists and their newspapers did not
generally have a partisan or normative starting
point in deciding priorities in topic coverage,
but rather paid attention to what their
audiences really needed (or wanted to read).
The press seems to have been motivated at
least to some degree to report on social
change, protest, and malfeasance, making a
genuine effort to inform and educate the
public. This would seem to indicate that the
Indonesian press had thus recreated itself as
a ‘cultural institution’ and an instrument of
social change and reformasi. It should once
again be emphasized that these findings are
more significant in their pioneering effort, in
raising the issues of press performance,
motivation, topic coverage, and possible bias,
and in blazing the trail for more detailed,
quantitative and probing analysis of the role
of the press in Indonesia’s newly emerging
democratic, decentralized, transparent, and
accountable political, social, and economic
system.
Journalist Professionalism in the Era of
Decentralization
Conceptually, it seems clear that the
information reported by the Indonesian press
can motivate people and facilitate reformasi
and initiate change in the community. This is
possible because: (i) it transfers new
information to its readers, (ii) it has access to
more information of a broader variety than
do individuals or the local communities, and
(iii) it can mirror and project the ‘reality of
events’ and developments in the nation and
in the local community to the citizens, local
community leaders, social activists,
politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of
government. However, in order to gather such
information and properly disseminate it, the
Indonesian press must have ‘professional
journalists’, with ‘professionalism’ defined by
a journalist’s competence in gathering
information, analyzing it, and being able to
report it accurately and understandably, and
by doing all this while adhering to a ‘journalist
code of ethics’. If an individual has the
required competence and instinctively abides
by such a code of ethics, he or she can
rightfully be called ‘a professional journalist’.
Journalism can sometimes be a dangerous
profession. In general, however, a professional
journalist usually does not experience
violence, because attacks on journalists most
often occur due to technical difficulties
associated with the relationship of the
journalist with the subject of his or her
reporting, or with an informant. It would seem
to be true that the more unprofessional this
relationship, the greater the risk of violence a
journalist is likely to face. An important
question is thus: Have Indonesian journalists
become more professional in the era of
decentralization? Journalist’s responses from
the same survey are tabulated in Table 2.
From Table 2, it appears that a larger
percentage of journalists are regarded by their
peers as ‘semi--professional’ rather than
‘professional’, though the size of the two
categories are remarkably close.
The percentage of journalists judged to be
professional is almost exactly the same in both
regions, with Java assessed as having more
‘semi-professionals’ and Outside Java seen as
having a larger share of ‘non-professionals’
‘Semi-professionals’ can include academics
and other urban intellectuals, of whom there
is probably a higher density in Java, and there
are more newspapers and other media there
than Outside Java to which they have access.
When a bureaucrat intimidates a journalist
who is gathering public information, he or she
‘violates’ the journalist. When a bureaucrat
forces a journalist to publish a specific piece
of misinformation, that also is a violation of
the journalist’s integrity. Such violations can
also involve bribery, intimidation, or veiled
or open threats of imprisonments or even
assassination. However, journalists who were
violated in this way may also be culpable in
being ‘unprofessional’ in that they lacked the
ethical standards, skills or motivation to resist
the threats, or to take available means to
counter them in this new age of freedom,
accountability and media freedom.
Table 2: The Perceived Professionalism
of Indonesian Journalists
According to Journalists(How would you
Rank the Professionalism of Indonesian
Journalists?)
Inside Java
Outside Java
Professional
Semi-Professional
Non-Professional
Professional
Semi-professional
Non-Professional
41.5%
48.7%
9.8%
41.4%
44.7%
13.9%
According to Bureaucrats(Do you regard
Journalist’s Behaviour as Professional?)
Inside Java
Outside Java
“Yes”: 25.4%
“No”: 74.6%
“Yes”: 22.8%
“No”: 77.2%
Source: Governance and Decentralization
Survey: Questionnaire for print journalists,
and also for Bupati (‘regents’) and Walikota
(‘mayors’).
Some information on how professional
journalists appear to bureaucrats is shown in
Table 2, based on responses of 55 heads of
regencies and 55 regency secretaries. In this
survey, respondents were simply asked to
answer yes or no to the question whether, from
their experience, they assessed journalists to
have behaved professionally. Journalist
professionalism was established by two
criteria: journalistic skills, and obedience to
‘news limits’ (i.e. observance of the law,
journalistic ethics, and an appropriate
journalist code of conduct). The findings for
Java and Outside Java are very similar, with
three-quarters of bureaucrats judging
journalists to be behaving unprofessionally,
and with slightly more bureaucrats Outside
Java concurring with this negative
assessment. Comparing the two sections of
Table 2, it is evident that there is a glaring
difference in perception between the opinions
of bureaucrats and how journalists see
themselves. How can we account for this? It
is possible that bureaucrats are at odds with
journalists, seeing them as interlopers or
trouble-makers looking for scandal, and
taking advantage of press freedom to
adversely or unfairly report news events or
political developments in their regency or city.
Some bureaucrats said that the Indonesian
press in general had become a ‘pamphlet
press’, with reporters having a negative
preconception regarding the conditions or
prevailing arrangements in the localities on
which they are reporting, and thus selected
the facts that supported such biases. Whatever
the reasons, it seems to be difficult for
bureaucrats to create a congenial and open
relationship with journalists. Bureaucrats and
journalists have different interests, especially
in regard to what facts and activities of
prominent individuals should be made the
object of public inquiry and widespread
publication in the community.
The above findings illustrate that there seems
no simple task to define and assess journalist’s
professionalism in the new reformasi era. It
is also not easy to judge how far the ambitions
of the Indonesian press to promote or provoke
change, and to educate or indoctrinate the
people in the era of decentralization is actually
being or can be fulfilled. What seems clear,
however, is the determination shown by a
large section of the Indonesian press to fulfill
its role as a cultural, reformist, and socially
responsible institution in the era of transition
toward a more open and democratic society.
Developing the Indonesian Press
as a Cultural Institution in the
Decentralization Era
What also seems clear is that demands for the
Indonesian press to further develop into a
socially responsible and cultural institution do
not come only from journalists and press
owners, but also from the public. If sectors of
the public feel that the press and other media
are not helping their interests, they can be
quick to demonstrate their dismay and anger.
There have been many incidents of this in
recent years, when, for example, groups of
people have attacked press offices, or have
obstructed journalists’ access to a community
or public meeting, or have prevented them
from gathering facts about incidents of social
conflict or about activities or members of
particular organizations, and in such
situations, and in personal vendettas, there
have been many instances of journalists being
violently confronted.
Journalists are exposed to many types of
physical violence and non-physical threats.
Table 3 provides some data on the types of
physical and non-physical pressures
experienced by journalists in the period March
1998 to April 1999, published by the Press
and Development Study Organization (LSPP,
Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan) and
the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI,
Aliansi Jurnalis Independen).
Table 3: Sources and Types of Pressure
Against Journalists, March 1998 - April
1999
Categories
Source of Pressure
Physical Pressure
Non-physical Pressure
1 Security personnel
11 (55%)(55%) 7 (26%)26%)
2 Governmental officials 1
(5%)5%) 9 (33%)33%)
3 Local community
groups 5 (25%)
10 (37%)
4 Unknown
3 (15%)(15%) 1 (4%)
Source: Suranto et.al, 1999; 64.
The data suggest that, taking physical
and non-physical pressure together, local
community incidents account for the highest
percentage of cases where journalists were
subject to such interference. In terms of
physical (or more violent) pressure, security
guards were identified as being most
implicated, while local communities
accounted for 25% of such incidents. This
shows that the public communities are capable
of conducting physical violence if the press
media are seen to be too inquisitive, as is seen
as having misreported or shown a bias against
their interests. It surely is not easy for reporters
to figure out what are the exact demands and
interests of the public, but in this era of
turbulent change, uncertainty, and uneasy
transition to democratic decentralization, the
public obviously needs lots of information
regarding what is happening, how to protect
and further their legitimate interests
(especially in their interaction with
government), how to monitor and influence
local politicians, and how to define and
expand their role in civil society. The
Indonesian press must play a key role in
helping provide such information, involving
clear analyses and informed commentary on
all of these concerns, if it genuinely intends
to serve as a cultural institution of responsible
instrument of social reform.
It is always praiseworthy to declare
one’s sincere intentions to serve the ‘public
good’ and the nation’s ‘best interests’. But the
Indonesian press experience in the new era
of press freedom, reformasi and
decentralization, shows a need for more
professionalism and dedication to make such
intentions a permanent and indisputable
reality. Results so far are encouraging, and
should stimulate the press to improve its
performance in meeting the public’s needs and
expectations, so that it is recognized not only
by its readers, and by citizens at large, as well
as community leaders, politicians and
bureaucrats, as an honest purveyor of
information, valuable cultural institution, a
positive force for change, and a respected
profession that a new generation of intelligent
and energetic young recruits will be proud to
join.
Public Sphere Encountering the
Indonesian Press
As a fourth estate, the Indonesia Pres
involvement in a democratization process is
inevitable. In order to do that, as notes by
Ashadi Siregar, the Indonesian press has to
warrant: (i) public facts promulgated by the
media press are those worth as public issues;
(ii) public issues reported by the press are
journalism information; (iii) journalism
information becomes the sources in the
process of the creation of public opinion
(2002:xviii). This explanation has showed that
the Indonesian press must work hard to be
able to participate in the democratization
process.
A further question then occur
following this explanation, what kind of
participation should be provided by the press
in a real political realm, so it could be regarded
as involving in a democratization process?
Before we could answer this particular
question, we need to discuss several
approaches in advance about participation in
the political world. One of these approaches,
as notes by Thomas Meyer and Lew
Hinchman, consists of, first, the democracy
as a market place. This model emphasizes that
the choice of political elites as a much
stipulation to fulfill the needs of democracy,
namely,   the creation of political conducts
that ensue a policy to defend public interests.
Second, the participatory of democracy. This
model explains that the necessity claim to
legitimize a democratic society is: citizens are
not only participate in general election, but
also in formulating and maintaining their
interests in various organizations. Third,
democratic civil society, known also as  civil
society model. It explains that democracy
cannot too much to hope for from many
institutions nor organizations, such as systems
and political parties, but rests upon the
participation and decision making which
should be generated by the civil society
(2002:5-7). These three models, actually,
comply with the normative claim of western
democracy. Everyone agrees that the
comprehensive and reliable information about
social and political systems should always be
available.
For the Indonesian context, the
reformation that had overthrown the new
order rezime has received a kind of mandate
to materialized civil society (Siregar,
2002:xix). Suchlike, the participation model
that conforms to the press in the development
of democracy is democratic civil society
model. Civil society itself, as indicates by
Afan Gaffar, is a type of society, whether
individually or group, able to well participate
with the government independently
(1997:30). In order to interact and well
participate, each individual and group needs
accurate information about political systems
from the media press.
In providing accurate information on
political life, free public sphere is always
imperative. Free here means, that is no power
could dominate public sphere, such as the
power of government, religion and so on.
Public have wide access to various institutions
available in the community life, started from
a state bureaucracy, parliament, justice and
the legal systems, interest groups, political
parties, and so on. Reality, however, shows
that public sphere after the collapse of the new
order had become the object of intense
competition among many social groups with
mass communalism based. One of the original
mass communalisms, according to Ashadi
Siregar is a political party (2002:xxii).
The occurrence of the facts is certainly
inevitable. In this particular condition, a
question then comes forth, how do political
parties respond to it? In the civil society, the
position of political parties could essentially
be a part of the government sovereignty,
namely, political parties who prevail in
general election (Gaffar, 1997:29). While the
position for the loser, serve as the balance of
power of the government.
Conclusions
The above discussion supports the
view that the Indonesian press it itself
undergoing a major reformasi following its
emancipation and reconstruction under the
post-Suharto regimes of  Habibe, Wahid, and
Megawati. In many respects the results are
really impressive. Indonesian journalists are
now free to report news according to the
values in which they believe in and that they
see best serve the nation’s and the varied
community interests. Indonesian press owners
no longer must adhere to a political imperative
imposed by a corporatist state authority, and
indeed they have sought rationally to fulfill
their economic or commercial imperative of
financial sustainability. But this obsession has
not diverted their papers from meeting its
cultural and moral obligations in the era of
decentralization and democratization.
In implementing its moral function,
the Indonesian press has not limited itself to
reporting political news, or scandalously
reveling in reporting corruption or the self-
interest squabbles and infighting of Jakarta-
based politicians. Instead, the Indonesian
press has played a generally responsible role
in disseminating crucial facts and other
information and in publicizing proposals for
reform, in generating new ideas and
components for a new social vision, while also
encouraging people to find out and respond
what is happening around them in terms of
social, political, and economic concerns, to
protest injurious public policies and to
propose new regulations that help the local
community, and to expose, condemn and
avoid being involved in KKN. It can thus be
said that the Indonesian press is meeting its
responsibility to help inform and educate its
readers, and to improve the quality of life of
Indonesian citizens.
One primary condition that the Indonesian
press must address if it is to win and retain
the trust and respect of its readers, the social
and political decision-makers, and the public
at large, and this is to maintain and improve
its level of professionalism. We have seen that
there is some divergence of perceptions in this
regard between journalists and bureaucrats.
In their own opinion, journalists have a high
level of professionalism, but bureaucrats
question the self-assurance. In consequence,
it is hard to objectively determine from
information available the actual level of
professionalism being practiced throughout
the many regions of Indonesia. All that we
know is that responsible parts and
organizations of the Indonesian press are
conscientiously and continuously trying to
implement its moral function, while local
communities are also exerting pressure on the
press to extend and better fulfill its moral
function.
What can be concluded is that, with
increasing professionalism of its journalists,
the Indonesian press can surely improve its
role as a channel of reliable information,
objective analysis, and support for reform and
democratization. It can play a critical role in
helping the people and local communities to
understand the many changes that are taking
place, the challenges and opportunities that
they present, and how to actively participate
in charting their own future on the road to
democracy and a better life. The biggest need
and challenge is the development of the
Indonesian press as an essential element in
the democratization process. This puts a huge
burden on the Indonesian press and also
makes it vulnerable to attack by forces trying
to limit or reverse democratization.***
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